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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether mutual fund governance has an effect on fund dividend policy 
in the Egyptian Stock Market. Using a final sample of 27 mutual funds between 2004 and 2013, this paper 
applies a Structural Equation Modelling technique to solve the potential endogeneity problem between internal 
governance measures and dividend policy. The empirical evidence shows a positive correlation between 
governance quality and dividend policy measured by dividend yield. The results are consistent with the notion 
that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force managers to disgorge more cash 
through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic manager. No significant 
association was found between board independency and dividend policy, because firms with higher number of 
independent directors are more restricted to pay higher dividends. This study provides additional evidence of the 
applicability of the Outcome Model in the emerging market of Egypt. It was found that the payment of higher 
dividend was considered necessary to attract capital during this transitional period. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Dividend Policy, Mutual Fund, Endogeneity. 
JEL Classification: G34, G35, G23, C3. 
 
1. Introduction 
A large body of previous literature investigated the relationship between corporate governance and dividend 
policies in developed markets (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook, 1984). However, there is a few 
studies have addressed the potential relationship between corporate governance and dividends policy in 
emerging markets (Adaoglu, 2000).  
The quality of corporate governance should have significant impact on dividend policy. Jiraporn et al 
(2011) find that there is a positive relationship between dividend payouts and corporate governance, firms with 
stronger corporate governance are more likely to pay dividends (Chae, et al 2009). Corporate governance and 
dividend policies reduce agency problems, which result from the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. Accordingly, two agency models were identified by La Porta et al. (2000): the outcome model and 
the substitute model. The “outcome model” suggests that dividends is an outcome of legal protection of 
shareholders. Therefore, a positive correlation between the investor protection and the firm dividend policy can 
be suggested, and firms with better corporate governance pay higher dividends for alleviating the manager-
shareholder conflict.  
Some previous studies document empirical evidence consistent with outcome hypothesis. Renneboog 
and Szilagyi (2006) find that firms with strong shareholders pay higher dividend in Dutch firms. Michaely and 
Roberts (2006) suggest that strong governance encourages higher payouts using data on firms in the U.K. La 
Porta et al. (2000) find that firms pay more dividends in countries where minority shareholder rights are better 
protected. 
On the contrary, “substitute model” asserts that the dividend is a substitute of legal protection. Firms 
with weaker legal protections of minority shareholders pay more dividends to establish their reputation and 
compensate minority shareholders. Thus, it is expected a negative relationship between the investor protection 
and dividend policy. In other words, larger dividends substitute for weaker governance.   
Some recent studies provide evidence consistent with the substitute hypothesis. Officer (2007) finds a 
negative relationship between corporate governance and dividend payouts when the strength of corporate 
governance is measured by the Governance Index, developed by Gompers et al. (2003). John and Knyazeva 
(2006), using a comprehensive index that takes into account board structure, institutional block holdings, and 
Gompers et al.’ Index, also find a substitution effect between governance quality and dividend payouts. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of corporate governance in Egyptian mutual fund 
dividend policy. The central question addressed in the paper is: To what extent the various dividend theories can 
be applicable in explaining dividend policy in an emerging capital market, in a country in transition?  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the previous literature and empirical 
hypothesis on the relationship between mutual fund corporate governance and dividends pay-out policy; section 
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3 discusses the econometric approach and data description; section 4 lays out the structural equation modelling 
analysis. Finally, section 5 presents research contributions and suggestions for future studies. 
 
2     Literature Review and the Hypotheses 
One of important rights for investors is dividend. Jensen and Meckling (1976) find that there is a conflict of 
interests between the management and investors. However, in emerging markets, agency problem also happen 
between the majority and minority shareholders (Nam et al., 2004). Dividend and good corporate governance 
mechanisms are important to protect minority shareholders’ rights. Kumar (2006) shows that corporate 
governance mechanism influences dividend policy. There is a controversy about the relationship of corporate 
governance and dividend payout. Hwang et al, (2013) find that corporate governance enhanced the payout policy 
ratio. Similarly, Bhatti (2013) find that the effect of size and profitability on dividend payout was positive 
before, during, and after the financial crisis. Lefort and Walker (2005) find a significant relationship among 
corporate governance, dividend payout and firm performance. Francis et al (2011) argue that managers prefer not 
to pay dividends, and firms who pay high dividend have the strong business level. Jiraporn et al (2011) 
illustrated in their study that there is a positive association between the quality of corporate governance 
mechanisms and dividends, therefore they confirm outcome theory. 
On the other hand, Jiraporn and Ning (2006), Renneboog and Szilagyi (2008) find that firms with poor 
corporate governance give higher dividend. Poor corporate governance compensates their weaknesses with 
higher dividend in order to attract investors. There is a negative relationship between corporate governance and 
dividend policy, therefore they confirm substitution theory. Similarly, Chae et al (2009) illustrated that firms 
with more effective corporate governance pay lower dividends. Given the mixed evidence of prior research, this 
paper aims to reveal the nature of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend payouts. 
A key concern in this type of studies has to do with the potential endogeneity problem as discussed by 
Klapper and Love (2003) and Black et al (2006) among others. It might be possible, however, that corporate 
governance and dividend policy are endogenously determined. In the context of this paper, the endogeneity 
problem would arise, if firms with high performance tended to adopt good governance practices in order to 
further improve their dividends. There are many methods of overcoming this; including Maximum likelihood 
(ML) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
Although, GMM and ML is a general framework for deriving estimators, there is a difference between 
the assumptions of the two methods. ML estimators use assumptions about the specific families of distributions 
for the random variables to derive an objective function.  It selects the parameters that are probably have 
generated the observed data, which can be proceeded by maximizing an objective function. GMM estimators use 
assumptions about the moments of the random variables to derive an objective function. The assumed moments 
of the random variables present population moment conditions, which can be achieved by minimizing an 
objective function. Accordingly, ML can be more efficient than GMM, because ML uses the entire distribution 
instead of uses specified moments only (Breitung and Lechner, 1995). 
Therefore, this paper utilizes SEM which is a multivariate technique that allows us to estimate a 
system of equations. Structural Equation Models are often drawn as Path Diagrams. SEM is a Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML), which estimates all the equations and all the unknown parameters jointly and 
obtains robust findings, compared with GMM. Therefore, this study uses different independent variables as 
illustrated below: 
Board size: as the most critical corporate governance mechanism, boards of directors play an important 
role in setting the strategic direction of an organization (Braun and Latham, 2007).  There are two competing 
views in the literature about the effect of board size. One view is that large boards allow directors to specialize. 
Greater specialization can lead to more effective monitoring (Klein, 2002), and hence lower dividends are 
needed for the monitoring role. Similarly, Riaz et al (2016) find that board size has a significant positive 
influence on the firm pay-out policy. It means that a large board size generated good profits that resulted in 
higher pay-out ratio. Adjaoud (2010) find that board composition is positively related to payout ratios. The other 
view is that large boards are less effective than small boards due to the difficulties of coordinating large groups 
(Jensen, 1993). Similarly, Guest (2009) suggest that there is a significant inverse relationship between board size 
and profitability, because poor communication might lead to difficulty in decision-making process which 
restricts the influence of large board of directors which might resulted in lower pay-out ratio  
H1: There is a negative significant relationship between board size and dividend policy (dividend yield and 
dividend frequency). 
Proportion of independent directors and inside directors: the two ways inside outside director classification is 
used to measure the proportion of inside directors on the board, and the proportion of outside directors on the 
board. Belden et al (2005) argued that the outside directors on the company board tend to reduce the agency cost 
in the firm and also represent the shareholders effectively and ensure their rights in the company. As a result, 
they concluded that the more outside members there were on the board, the more dividends the company was 
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willing to pay. On the other hand, Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) argue that outside directorship in a board has 
a significant negative impact on the dividends paid out because firms with higher number of outside directors on 
the board are more restricted to pay higher dividends. 
H2: There is a positive significant relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the board and 
dividend policy (dividend yield and dividend frequency). 
Corporate governance index: Similar to Erkens et al (2012), the influence of corporate governance on firm 
performance is explored. A governance index is constructed – calculated as an average of six governance 
indicators: (1) Effective Corporate Governance Framework (2) The rights of shareholders (3) The equitable 
treatment of share-holders (4) The role of stakeholders in corporate governance (5) Disclosure and transparency 
(6) The responsibilities of the board – using the annual reports of the companies and the companies' websites, 
based on the OECD Corporate Governance Principles April 2004 (EFSA). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) illustrate 
that the goal of corporate governance is to protect (minority) shareholders. A positive relationship exists between 
corporate governance and dividend payout ratio because companies with stronger governance mechanisms are 
better at monitoring their managers; therefore, managers are less likely to use the money for their personal 
benefits, and as a result pay higher dividends (Farinha, 2003). This paper is in favor of the “outcome 
hypothesis”. 
H3: There is a positive significant relationship between the corporate governance index of the fund management 
company and dividend policy (dividend yield and dividend frequency). 
Mutual Fund Performance: for the analysis of the impact of mutual fund performance on dividend policy the 
abnormal returns will be measured by Sharp ratio - as the most common risk adjusted performance measures - 
which measures the excess return over the risk free rate per unit of total risk (Sharpe, 1966). As indicated before, 
firms with stronger governance mechanisms have better firm performance, which can result in higher dividend 
payout ratio (Francis et al., 2011). Similarly, Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013) argue that there is a positive 
relationship between profitability and dividend payout before, during and after the crisis. 
H4: There is a positive significant relationship between mutual fund performance and dividend policy (dividend 
yield and dividend frequency). 
Director’s tenure: similar to Villiers et al (2011), director’s tenure is measured as the average number of years 
the firm’s directors have served on the board either the fund management company board or any other boards, 
and similar to Chan et al (2013) and Lassoued and Elmir (2012), the average board tenure of directors is 
included in the regression analysis. Del Guercio et al (2003) notes that directors who are long-serving can lose 
their ability to remain independent and therefore, become less effective as representatives for the shareholder.  
H5: There is a negative relationship between the average tenure of directors and corporate governance index of 
the fund management company. 
Board committee structure: to examine the role of board committee structure on the performance of mutual 
funds, this paper focuses on investment committees. Similar to Chan et al. (2013) and Lassoued and Elmir 
(2012), the proportion of directors on the investment committee is included in the regression analysis. 
Furthermore, Klein (1998) finds a positive correlation between the percentage of inside directors on investment 
committees and stock returns. This result is consistent with Fama and Jensen’s (1983) argument that inside 
director presents prominent knowledge helping the board of directors to make the right investment decisions in 
the long term strategy and therefore leads to a higher level of CG Index. 
H6: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of directors on the investment committee and 
corporate governance index of the fund management company 
The following discussion contains a brief description of the control variables. 
Time: the period of the study is the years between 2004 and 2013 that can affect the payout policy of 
the fund. Jones (2007) suggests that investors who wish to maximize return should start their search by looking 
for younger funds. Similarly, Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) find strong evidence of out-performance of hedge 
funds during the first two to three years of existence. Based upon the previous discussion, there is a negative 
relationship between the fund age – which increases over time – and fund performance. Accordingly, there is a 
negative relationship between the time and fund performance which might lead to lower dividend yield. 
Investment objective dummy variables: the type of investment objective a fund adopts affects the 
dividends pay out policy. Similar to Ferris and Yan (2007), a series of dummy variables is included to capture 
the investment objectives represented in the sample to take a value of 1 if the fund belongs to the same category 
under study and zero otherwise. The investment objectives represented in the sample are:     Fund Obj1: Open 
End Islamic Fund, Fund Obj2: Open End Equity Fund, Fund Obj3: Open End Balanced Fund, and Fund Obj4: 
Open End Islamic Balanced Fund. 
Number of funds overseen by the fund management company: similar to Ferris and Yan (2007), this 
variable is included in the regression which is motivated by the busyness hypothesis of Ferris et al (2003). They 
conclude that there is no significant evidence that multiple board memberships harm firm value. On the contrary, 
they find that fund Management Company with multiple funds to monitor possessing prominent expertise as a 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.4, 2017 
 
125 
director. This paper finds that there is a positive relationship between number of funds over seen by the fund 
Management Company and corporate governance index which is consistent with Ferris and Yan (2007) 
argument.  
Finally, the following Table 1 summarizes the key studies in the previous literature that investigate the 
effect of corporate governance on dividend policy. 
Table 1: Empirical Evidence of Impact of Corporate Governance in Dividend Policy 
Empirical Studies  Governance Relationship  Agency Model  
La Porta et al. (2000)  Investor protection Positive relationship Outcome model 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) Ownership and Performance Positive relationship Outcome model 
Adjaoud and Ben‐ Amar 
(2010) 
Internal Governance variables Positive relationship Outcome model 
Jiraporn et al (2011) Internal Governance variables Positive relationship Outcome model 
Albuquerque et al. (2015) Firm level Corporate Governance Positive relationship Outcome model 
Abreu and Gulam-hussen 
(2013) 
Internal Governance variables Positive relationship Outcome model 
Riaz et al (2016) Internal Governance variables Positive relationship Outcome model 
Gao et al. (2013)  Firm level Corporate Governance Negative relationship  Substitute model  
Officer (2007) Internal and External Governance 
variables 
Negative relationship Substitute model 
Esqueda (2016) Investor protection Law Ownership Negative relationship Substitute model 
 
3 The Data  
In this paper, the population is extracted from an updated version of the Egyptian mutual fund database in the 
Egyptian Stock Market existing at the end of December 2013 (EIMA). The original sample contains all mutual 
funds that are active from 2004 to 2013 which are 84 mutual funds belong to 14 categories (EIMA). From the 
initial sample, the researcher excludes fixed income funds and money market funds because they pay a fixed rate 
of dividends. The final random sample for the study is restricted to 27 mutual funds between 2004 and 2013. The 
sample is free from survivor-ship bias, since the sample includes both surviving and dead funds. 
This paper uses secondary data only which is collected from the most recent available data from the 
Egyptian Stock Market, Central Bank of Egypt, EIMA, World Bank, EFSA, Misr for Central Clearing, 
Depository and Registry (MCDR), and National Bank of Egypt. The data is a panel data that tracks the dividends 
of several mutual funds at several points in time 2004-2013. 
The dividend policy is represented by two variables. The first is dividend yield, which is defined as 
(annual dividends amount per share/ initial price per share) (Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008). The second is 
dividend frequency defined as: the number of months when a mutual fund pays dividends (from 0 to 12). I 
consider dividend distributions in the same month as one time (Elton et al. 2011). See, Table 2 providing a full 
set of variables of the study (Huber & Mellace, 2015). 
Table 2: Summary of Endogenous, Exogenous and Control Variables 
Panel (A) Endogenous Variables 
Variables Measures Source 
Dividend 
Policy () 
 =
 
 
 
= Number of months when a mutual 
fund pays dividends 
Calculated from mutual 
fund's prospectuses, and 
mutual fund's financial 
statements. 
Corporate governance 
index () 
 
 
 
A constructed governance index calculated as an 
average of six governance indicators: (1) Effective 
Corporate Governance Framework (2) The rights 
of shareholders (3) The equitable treatment of 
shareholders (4) The role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance (5) Disclosure and 
transparency (6) The responsibilities of the board. 
Calculated from the annual 
reports of the fund 
management companies and 
the companies' websites. 
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Panel (B) Exogenous Variables 
Variables Measures Source 
Board size ( ) The size of the board. Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
Proportion of independent 
directors ( !")   
The number of independent directors on the 
board divided by board size. 
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
Board committee 
structure ( #$%%) 
The number of directors on the investment 
committee divided by board size.    
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
Director’s 
tenure ( &') 
 
The average number of years the firm’s 
directors have served on the board either the 
fund management company board or any other 
boards. 
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
Mutual funds financial 
performance  (() 
 
) =
*+ − +-.
/
 
Calculated from mutual fund's 
prospectuses, mutual fund's 
financial statements, and 
economic review of Central 
Bank of Egypt. 
 
Panel (C) Control Variables 
Time (01) The years (2004-2013) due to data availability. Sample Period. 
Investment objective 
dummy variables  
* 234. 
This study uses dummy variables for the 
investment objectives represented in the sample to 
take a value of 1 if the fund belongs to the same 
category under study and zero otherwise. 
Mutual fund prospectuses. 
Number of funds overseen 
by the fund management 
company ( 5') 
The number of funds overseen by the fund 
management company. 
 
Board of director's annual 
reports of Egyptian mutual 
funds. 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
The results are based on a sample of 208 annual observations for 27 mutual funds from 2004 to 2013. 
See, Table 3 which includes three panels. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy 
Panel A: Fund and Governance Descriptive Statistics  
Model (A) Number of obs =    208 Model (B) Number of obs =    208 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
CGQ 0.6154 0.1680 0.1667 0.8333 0.6154 0.1680 0.1667 0.8333 
DivYield 0.0528 0.0643 0 0.3125 
DivFreq 1.3173 1.1858 0 4 
Time 2009 2.7569 2004 2013 
FundObj1 0.1635 0.3707 0 1 0.1635 0.3707 0 1 
FundObj2 0.5529 0.4984 0 1 0.5529 0.4984 0 1 
FundObj3 0.2692 0.4446 0 1 0.2692 0.4446 0 1 
Perf 0.0378 0.2310 -0.4916 0.5106 0.0378 0.2310 -0.4916 0.5106 
BSize 9.4183 3.4603 4 16 9.4183 3.4603 4 16 
IndDir 0.8245 0.2146 0.3125 1 0.8245 0.2146 0.3125 1 
InvComm 0.1643 0.0981 0.0833 0.5455 0.1643 0.0981 0.0833 0.5455 
DirFn 10.625 5.1013 1 15 10.625 5.1013 1 15 
DirTn 19.481 6.6941 6 29 19.481 6.6941 6 29 
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations (Model A) 
 
Variable Time Perf DivYield BSize IndDir InvComm DirFn DirTn CGQ FundObj1 FundObj2 FundObj3 
Time 1 
Perf -0.3681 1 
DivYield -0.4132 0.4877 1 
BSize -0.2486 0.0617 0.25 1 
IndDir 0.2147 -0.0235 -0.0238 -0.1056 1 
InvComm -0.1011 0.0479 0.1252 -0.1262 -0.5079 1 
DirFn 0.0364 -0.0099 -0.0518 0.2112 0.4658 -0.7292 1 
DirTn -0.2923 0.0775 0.2636 0.6851 -0.0326 -0.0921 0.3433 1 
CGQ 0.0293 -0.0152 0.0679 0.4263 0.3412 -0.4888 0.6548 0.1094 1 
FundObj1 0.1212 -0.0929 0.0022 -0.0046 0.1023 -0.186 0.2267 0.0344 0.1741 1 
FundObj2 -0.1297 0.1088 0.026 0.2546 0.0074 -0.1461 0.1522 0.0995 0.071 -0.4916 1 
FundObj3 0.0114 -0.0282 -0.0254 -0.2588 -0.1202 0.326 -0.2982 -0.094 -0.17 -0.2683 -0.675 1 
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlations (Model B) 
 
Variable Perf DivFreq BSize IndDir InvComm DirFn DirTn CGQ FundObj1 FundObj2 FundObj3 
Perf 1 
DivFreq 0.2572 1 
BSize 0.0617 -0.0113 1 
IndDir -0.0235 -0.1826 -0.1056 1 
InvComm 0.0479 0.2500 -0.1262 -0.5079 1 
DirFn -0.0099 -0.2334 0.2112 0.4658 -0.7292 1 
DirTn 0.0775 0.2040 0.6851 -0.0326 -0.0921 0.3433 1 
CGQ -0.0152 -0.2251 0.4263 0.3412 -0.4888 0.6548 0.1094 1 
FundObj1 -0.0929 0.0243 -0.0046 0.1023 -0.186 0.2267 0.0344 0.1741 1 
FundObj2 0.1088 -0.2819 0.2546 0.0074 -0.1461 0.1522 0.0995 0.0710 -0.4916 1 
FundObj3 -0.0282 0.3045 -0.2588 -0.1202 0.3260 -0.2982 -0.0940 -0.1700 -0.2683 -0.6750 1 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 208 annual observations for 27 mutual funds from 
2004 to 2013 
Panel A provides main fund and governance statistics for the overall sample. Included are the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the variables used in the analysis for the two models (A), and 
(B). DivYield, and DivFreq, for the overall sample, have mean values of, 5%, and 1.32 months respectively. For 
the overall sample, all variables used in the analysis except (DivYield, and DivFreq) for the two models (A), and 
(B) have similar mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values. 
For the overall sample, on average, the board structure is comprised of 9 directors, and about 82% of 
them are independent directors. The board composition, on average, consists of 16% of directors on the 
investment committee. The average tenure of directors is 19 years. Furthermore, the corporate governance index, 
on average, is 62%. The number of funds overseen by the fund management company, on average, is 11 mutual 
funds per company. Fund performance, on average, is 4%.  Furthermore, the major funds in the sample belong to 
open end equity fund. 
Panel B provides the correlations between all variables included in model (A).  DivYield is positively 
correlated with BSize, InvComm, DirTn, and CGQ and negatively correlated with IndDir, and DirFn. Perf 
exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with BSize, InvComm, and DirTn. BSize exhibits the same 
pattern and is positively correlated with DirTn, and CGQ and negatively correlated with IndDir. IndDir exhibits 
the same pattern and is positively correlated with CGQ. DirFn exhibits the same pattern and is positively 
correlated with DirTn, and CGQ. Finally, DirTn exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with CGQ. 
Interestingly, the correlations for BSize, and DirTn are positive for DivYield, and CGQ suggesting that vigilant 
boards are associated with a higher dividend pay-out, and a higher corporate governance index.  
Panel C provides the correlations between all variables included in model (B).  DivFreq is positively 
correlated with InvComm, and DirTn, and negatively correlated with IndDir, DirFn, and CGQ. Perf exhibits the 
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same pattern and is positively correlated with InvComm, and DirTn, and negatively correlated with IndDir. 
BSize exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with DirTn, and negatively correlated with IndDir. 
Finally, DirFn exhibits the same pattern and is positively correlated with DirTn. As indicated before in model 
(A), the correlation for DirTn is positive for DivFreq, and CGQ suggesting that vigilant boards are associated 
with a higher dividend frequency, and a higher corporate governance index.  
Overall, the results of the descriptive statistics are consistent with agency theory (e.g., Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), and the law and finance (e.g., López de Silanes et al., 1998) literatures suggest that firm good 
governance characteristics and vigilant board will enhance corporate value and dividends pay-out policy (Essen 
et al., 2013). 
Similar to (Essen et al., 2013), it is suggested that there is potential endogeneity between internal 
governance measures and dividends policy measured by dividend yield, and dividend frequency. Therefore, this 
potential endogeneity is examined in a structural equation model below. 
 
4. Structural Equation Modelling Analysis 
SEM is adapted from (Erkens et al., 2012), and (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). To test the effect of corporate 
governance on mutual fund dividends policy, this study uses the SEM technique through the following three 
stages: model specification, model estimation, and goodness of fit indices, which will be discussed respectively 
in the ensuing sections. 
 
4.1 Structural Model Specification   
For the analysis of the effect of corporate governance on mutual fund dividends policy, this study evaluates the 
previous hypotheses. To test this assertion, a simultaneous equation system is utilized, where fund dividends 
policy, and corporate governance index are endogenous variables by using the following structural equation 
model: 
(1)                                                                                                                             
 (2) 
 
4.2 The Estimation Results 
The results about the estimation of the structural model (A), (B) are presented in Table (4) which includes two 
panels for every model. The path diagram for the two models (A), and (B) is presented in Figure (1) and (2) 
respectively. According to the previous, in testing the hypotheses, results reveal that there are six hypotheses in 
this study, and five hypotheses i.e. H1, H3, H4, H5, and H6 are statistically significant. Thus, these hypotheses 
are supported. While, one hypothesis i.e. H2 is found statistically not significant. Hence, this hypothesis is not 
supported. 
Although the hypothesis is not supported, the result is consistent with Hussainey et al. (2011) 
argument that firms with higher number of independent directors are more restricted to pay higher dividends. 
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Table 4. Path Coefficients - Whole Sample (p value of the t tests in parentheses) 
           Model (A) Model (B) 
Panel A: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Mutual Fund Dividend Policy 
DivP 
CGQ 0.1232** (0.003) 0.8753 (0.280) 
Time -0.0051*** (0.000) 
FundObj1 -0.0114 (0.731) 0.3096 (0.632) 
FundObj2 -0.0236 (0.457) -0.1974 (0.750) 
FundObj3 -0.0302 (0.350) 0.4217 (0.503) 
Perf 0.1105*** (0.000) 1.3080*** (0.000) 
BSize -0.0024 (0.273) -0.1041* (0.014) 
IndDir 0.0292 (0.145) -0.3032 (0.433) 
DirFn -0.0052*** (0.000) -0.0845*** (0.001) 
DirTn 0.0035*** (0.001) 0.0924*** (0.000) 
Constant 10.2900*** (0.000) 1.0026 (0.163) 
Panel B: The Effect of Board Structure on Corporate Governance Index 
CGQ 
FundObj1 0.1279* (0.019) 0.1279* (0.019) 
FundObj2 0.0892 (0.090) 0.0892 (0.090) 
FundObj3 0.1644** (0.002) 0.1644** (0.002) 
BSize 0.0396*** (0.000) 0.0396*** (0.000) 
IndDir 0.1014** (0.002) 0.1014** (0.002) 
InvComm 0.2429* (0.011) 0.2429* (0.011) 
DirFn 0.02604*** (0.000) 0.02604*** (0.000) 
DirTn -0.0175*** (0.000) -0.0175*** (0.000) 
Constant 0.0691 (0.277) 0.0691 (0.277) 
var(e.DivYield) 0.0025 
var(e.CGQ) 0.0068 
var(e.DivFreq) 0.9567 
var(e.CGQ) 0.0068 
Observations 208 208 
Note: This table provides results from SEM of the effect of corporate governance on dividends policy (measured 
by dividend yield, and dividend frequency) for the sample of 27 funds from (2004-2013). A robust t-statistics 
test is conducted, and p-values are in parentheses. Columns (2) and (4) provide p-values. Columns (1) and (3) 
present the path coefficients for the two models. * Statistical significance at 10% level. ** Statistical significance 
at 5% level. *** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Figure 1. Path Diagram - Whole Sample - for Structural Equation Model (A) 
 
 
Figure 2. Path Diagram - Whole Sample - for Structural Equation Model (B) 
 
The Direct, Indirect and Total Effects 
Table (5) demonstrates direct, and indirect effects among all variables in the Structural Equation Model. It 
includes two panels (A), and (B). 
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Table 5. Summary of Direct and Indirect Effects of Structural Equation Model 
Direct Effects Indirect Effects 
 Model (A) Model (B)  Model (A) Model (B) 
 (1) (2) (1) (2)  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
Panel A: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Dividend Policy 
DivP DivP 
CGQ 0.12320 0.003 0.8753 0.280 CGQ 
Time -0.00513 0.000 Time 
FundObj1 -0.01137 0.731 0.3096 0.632 FundObj1 0.0158 0.066 0.1120 0.327 
FundObj2 -0.02363 0.457 -0.1974 0.750 FundObj2 0.0110 0.141 0.0781 0.363 
FundObj3 -0.03017 0.350 0.4217 0.503 FundObj3 0.0203 0.032 0.1439 0.308 
Perf 0.11050 0.000 1.3089 0.000 Perf 
BSize -0.00238 0.273 -0.1041 0.014 BSize 0.0049 0.004 0.0347 0.281 
IndDir 0.02921 0.145 -0.3032 0.433 IndDir 0.0125 0.032 0.0888 0.308 
InvComm InvComm 0.0299 0.053 0.2126 0.320 
DirFn -0.00522 0.000 -0.0845 0.001 DirFn 0.0032 0.004 0.0228 0.282 
DirTn 0.00353 0.001 0.0924 0.000 DirTn -0.0022 0.004 -0.0154 0.282 
Panel B: The Effect of Board Structure on Corporate Governance Index 
CGQ CGQ  
FundObj1 0.1280 0.019 FundObj1  
FundObj2 0.0892 0.090 FundObj2  
FundObj3 0.1644 0.002 FundObj3  
BSize 0.0396 0.000 BSize  
IndDir 0.1015 0.002 IndDir  
InvComm 0.2429 0.011 InvComm  
DirFn 0.0260 0.000 DirFn  
DirTn -0.0176 0.000 DirTn  
Note: This table provides summary of direct, and indirect effects from SEM of the effect of corporate 
governance on dividend policy of the Egyptian mutual fund for the sample of 27 funds from (2004-2013). 
Panel A: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Mutual Fund Dividend Policy 
Panel (A) demonstrates several significant direct, indirect, and total effects. Firstly Time, Perf, and DirFn have 
significant direct influence on DivP. Secondly, DirFn has significant indirect influence on DivP through the 
mediating effect of CGQ (DirFn CGQ DivP). Finally, Time, Perf, and DirFn have significant total influence 
on DivP. The Structural Equation Model indicates that evaluation of total effects on the determination of DivP 
arise from the combination of direct and indirect effects of the variables in the model. 
Panel B: The Effect of Board Structure on Corporate Governance Index 
Panel (B) demonstrates several significant direct, indirect, and total effects. Firstly, BSize, IndDir, InvComm, 
DirFn, and DirTn have a significant direct influence on CGQ. Secondly, BSize, IndDir, InvComm, DirFn, and 
DirTn have a significant total influence on CGQ.  The Structural Equation Model indicates that evaluation of 
total effects on the determination of CGQ arises from the direct effects of the variables in the model only 
because there are no indirect effects of the variables in this model. 
 
4.3 The Goodness of Fit 
The fit indices shown in Table (6) indicate that the hypothesized structural model provides a good fit to the data. 
In this study, the (R-squared) values of the endogenous variables in Table (7) range from 0.39 and 0.76 and the 
overall (R-squared) value is 0.85 for model (A), the (R-squared) values range from 0.32 and 0.76 and the overall 
(R-squared) value is 0.83 for model (B), these values fall within the acceptable range compared with other 
studies in the area of financial management research.  
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Table 6. Structural Equation Model Fit Measure Assessment 
Model (A)     Model (B) 
Fit Statistics Value Value Description 
Likelihood ratio 
chi2_ms 1.577 0.792 model vs. saturated 
p > chi2 0.665 0.673 
chi2_bs 400.197 375.389 baseline vs. saturated 
p > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Population error 
RMSEA 0.000 0.000 Root mean squared error of approximation 
90% CI, lower bound 0.000 0.000 
upper bound 0.091 0.105 
pclose 0.809 0.786 Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
Information criteria 
AIC 2804.669 3090.020 Akaike's information criterion 
BIC 2878.095 3160.108 Bayesian information criterion 
Baseline comparison 
CFI 1.000 1.000 Comparative fit index 
TLI 1.026 1.032 Tucker-Lewis index 
Size of residuals 
 SRMR 0.004 0.004 Standardized root mean squared residual 
 CD 0.852 0.826 Coefficient of determination 
           Note: This table provides summary of goodness of fit index. 
 
Table 7. Summary of (R-squared) 
Model (A) 
 
  
    
Dep vars fitted Variance predicted Residual R-squared mc mc2 
observed 
DivYield 0.004096 0.0015928 0.0025036 0.3888358 0.623567 0.388836 
CGQ 0.028086 0.0213018 0.0067841 0.758451 0.870891 0.758451 
overall 0.8517892 
mc  = correlation between depvar and its prediction 
mc2 = mc^2 is the Bentler-Raykov squared multiple correlation coefficient 
 
Model B 
Dep vars fitted Variance predicted Residual R-squared mc mc2 
observed 
DivFreq 1.399102 0.4424169 0.956685 0.316215 0.56233 0.316215 
CGQ 0.028086 0.0213018 0.006784 0.758451 0.870891 0.758451 
overall 0.8259641 
mc  = correlation between depvar and its prediction 
mc2 = mc^2 is the Bentler-Raykov squared multiple correlation coefficient 
 
5     Conclusion 
Achieving the aim of this study contributes to the finance literature at three levels, theoretical, methodological 
and empirical levels. At the theoretical level, this study uses agency theory to explain the relationship between 
corporate governance and dividend policy. The empirical evidence point out that firms with better governance 
quality exhibit a stronger propensity to pay dividends. This evidence is in agreement with the prediction of the 
outcome hypothesis, where shareholders of firms with stronger governance are able to force managers to 
disgorge more cash. Furthermore, studying the effect of corporate governance on dividend payout policy through 
a constructed corporate governance index might also add value to this area of investigation. This paper 
additionally extend the current literature linking governance mechanisms and dividend policies to specifically 
address an emerging capital market in a country undergoing a transitional period. Prior work in this area has 
primarily focused on developed capital markets. 
At the methodological level, unlike previous studies that have addressed that the relation between 
corporate governance and firm dividend policy may be spurious because they are endogenously determined and 
use OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS to overcome this problem (Abdelsalam and El-Masry 2008; Uwuigbe et al., 2015), this 
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study has achieved the broad objective of developing sophisticated statistical techniques, i.e., structural equation 
model (SEM) using STATA MP v.13. SEM allows simultaneous evaluation of the sufficiency of the causal 
model that is proposed to investigate the determinants of mutual fund dividend policy.  
At the empirical level, the study provides evidence of a negative association between between board 
size and dividend policy measured by dividend frequency. The study also provides evidence of a positive 
relationship between the corporate governance index of the fund management company and dividend policy 
measured by dividend yield. Additionally, the study provides evidence of a positive relationship between mutual 
fund performance and dividend policy measured by dividend yield and dividend frequency. These findings are 
consistent with the previous literature. 
For future research, the model in this study could be expanded to include more factors such as director 
compensation, because there is no data available for complex-level director compensation in the Egyptian mutual 
funds. Thus, this paper suggests that the Egyptian Stock Market should require funds to disclose the total director 
compensation by the complex rather than per fund. The availability of time series data on director compensation 
by the complex leads to higher quality compensation data for research on the relationship between compensation 
and dividend policy.  
This paper conclude that most of the hypothesized relationships are supported (e.g. BSize is negatively 
associated with DivFreq, CGQ is positively associated with DivYield, Perf is positively associated with 
DivYield and DivFreq, DirTn is negatively associated with CGQ, and InvComm is positively associated with 
CGQ) and one is not supported (e.g. IndDir is not associated with DivYield, and DivFreq). 
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